# Third independent partner-readiness audit closure

**State:** Remediated but truthfully blocked  
**Positive readiness:** Structurally impossible under the checked-in policy  
**Network, wallet, signature, deployment, RPC, install, commit, and push actions:** None

## Finding-by-finding closure

### C-01 — caller-controlled trust root

Closed at source. The validator loads a tracked, schema-validated trust policy.
The checked-in policy has status `no-external-authority-established` and null
root path, ID, and digest, so every positive-readiness path stops. A future
reviewed commit must pin all three values. The environment can only supply the
input location and cannot override the tracked authority, identifier, or
digest. The identity registry still requires an externally signed registry
attestation, exact organization membership, exact authority evidence,
key-ownership proof, role allowlists, internal/partner separation, and distinct
role holders.

### H-01 — fixed-point candidate construction

Closed at source. `candidateId` is a domain-separated hash of immutable external
artifact digests, exact organizations, package version, and selected scope. It
excludes the candidate/envelope IDs, commits, trees, timestamps, evidence,
signatures, and artifacts that embed the candidate. After the source and
evidence commits exist, a separate domain-separated `envelopeId` binds the
candidate ID to both exact commit/tree pairs. The scope upstream commit must be
an ancestor of the source commit, which must be an ancestor of the evidence
commit.

### H-02 — arbitrary scope registry and unchecked relationships

Closed at source. A usable registry must be derived from exact tracked blobs at
an existing upstream Git commit: supported modules, generated V3 route
inventory, and deployment manifest. The validator checks their exact digests,
generated route ID, GET method, path, read-only status, supported-source and
deployed-authorized module state, safe capability class, deployment enabled
scope, deployment contract, rollout stage, action, module source, protected
decision influence, and explicit denial of every unrelated module. Global,
monolithic, reputation, nonexistent, and incompatible selections fail closed.

### H-03 — digest-shaped objective artifacts

Closed at source. Every critical claim requires exact type-specific objective
artifacts and typed source blobs. Each blob must be a unique, non-symlink,
in-repository, non-ignored, tracked blob at the evidence commit, with an exact
digest and strict JSON. The validator parses and cross-binds source records,
exact-commit test results, canonical operations, executed commercial
agreements, controlled contact functions, and verified signature sets. Blob
paths and digests must be unique both within each artifact and across all
mandatory evidence.

### M-01 — approver not equal to assigned role holder

Closed at source. Every attestor and evidence approver must equal the exact
externally attested identity assigned to the corresponding manifest role.
Preparer, independent reviewer, authorized signatory, and partner acceptor are
distinct; the partner identity is separate from every internal assignment and
must belong to the distinct partner organization.

## Principles machine-enforced

- Accountability Bonds and Partnership Bonds are affirmatively documented as
  flourishing bonds supporting cooperation, accountable growth, and freedom.
- Flourishing cannot control principal, collateral, or any protected decision.
- Rewards cannot consume collateral.
- Surveillance, biometric, profiling, opaque, hashed, derived, and transitive
  protected-decision inputs are denied by a closed input enum and semantic
  normalization.
- Consent is explicit; liabilities and exits are bounded; paused refunds and
  terminal exits are required.
- Rollout is one module/stage at a time.
- Payments are pull-based; APIs deny unknown, stale, malformed, or unauthorized
  requests; evidence is immutable and exact-commit bound.
- Cross-chain portability is chain-specific, consented, minimal,
  unlinkability-reviewed, and excludes cross-chain value flow.

## Verification

- Normal Python suite: **85 passed, 0 failed**.
- Python `-O` suite: **85 passed, 0 failed**.
- Third independent harness: **25 secure, 0 insecure**.
- Named third-generation regressions: **25 audit cases plus 3 new attacks**.
- Strict JSON and duplicate-key pass before closure: **22 files**.
- Python AST parse: **8 files**.
- Truthful blocked report: deterministic; SHA-256
  `b783b18c99d20521ef410e82633bfc9d9c7d3fa9752db3e4d752531c72920cf6`.
- Cache-free isolated package copy: package gate passed with
  `pilotReady: false`, `organizationalPartnerReady: false`, and no network
  actions.
- Live package: correctly blocked by five unexpected `.pyc` cache files.

## Remaining blockers

All 25 mandatory evidence items remain open, including 14 external human
blockers: actual contacts, authorized signatory, change-RACI acceptance,
executed commercial agreement, counsel signoff, incident-plan acceptance,
insurance, legal entity, partner acceptance, privacy signoff, role assignments,
security-policy acceptance, signatures, and support-tier selection.

Five cache files remain. The gate rejects them. They were not removed because
the active execution policy prohibits deleting workspace files, even though the
task authorized cleanup. No readiness claim is made while they remain.

This package does not claim legal advice, entity formation, actual people or
contacts, insurance, counsel/privacy approval, partner acceptance, signatures,
audit completion, deployment, or production readiness.
